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This case raises two primary issues. The first is whether the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment to Inmate Legal Services (“ILS”) 
Supervisor Carol Lillie, concluding that she did not violate Merrick’s First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of court access when she refused to file 
his Motion for Reconsideration of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision 
affirming Merrick’s conviction on direct appeal.  
Lillie’s primary response is an attempt to shift the blame for her own 
misfeasance onto Merrick. She argues that she reasonably failed to 
appreciate that Merrick was not represented by counsel, despite the facts that 
1) Merrick repeatedly and unambiguously informed first her and then prison 
employees responsible for processing inmate grievances that he was 
unrepresented (“pro per”); and 2) Lillie knew that Merrick had filed a pro 
per brief in the direct appeal in which he sought reconsideration.  
Nonetheless, Lillie presses the argument that Merrick should have 
known to provide her the court of appeals decision affirming his conviction. 
But Lillie did not request the document, nor does she point to any other 
policy that would have required it. First, the question of what Lillie would 
have done had Merrick submitted the court of appeals decision is not one 
that can be resolved in her favor on summary judgment. Second, Lillie 
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admits that she received—one day before Merrick’s filing deadline—the 
very decision she claims would have impelled her to file Merrick’s Motion 
for Reconsideration, because Merrick submitted it with his Petition for 
Review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Yet Lillie then argues that, despite 
her decade of experience working at ILS, she failed to appreciate the 
difference between a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration. 
This is another factual question, but even if Lillie could prove this 
“mistake,” it does not excuse her willful failure to file Merrick’s motion. 
Lillie’s other arguments are equally fruitless. For example, she argues 
that Merrick’s Motion for Reconsideration was frivolous. But she does not 
argue that the arguments therein were wrong on the merits; rather, she 
argues only that they reprised arguments previously rejected by the court of 
appeals. This ignores that the very purpose of a motion for reconsideration is 
to permit a court to correct its own errors; in fact, Arizona courts do not 
generally permit new arguments to be raised in motions for reconsideration.  
Finally, Lillie argues that her conduct was merely negligent, an 
argument belied by the undisputed fact that she made a series of affirmative 
decisions, with ample time for deliberation, not to file Merrick’s motion. 
Alternatively, Lillie’s conduct met an intermediate standard of culpability, 
which this Court should deem actionable.  
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The second issue in this case is whether Merrick’s allegations that 
Arizona violated his religious liberties by refusing him unmonitored clergy 
phone calls were sufficient to survive the screening stage and require a 
response from the State. The State primarily argues that Merrick failed to 
allege that unmonitored calls were mandatory aspects of his religious 
practice. But that argument both misreads Merrick’s complaint, and 
misstates the relevant law, which does not limit religious accommodations to 
mandatory practices. Likewise, the State’s argument in favor of affirming 
the district court’s dismissal of Merrick’s Establishment Clause claim both 




I.  LILLIE VIOLATED MERRICK’S RIGHT OF COURT 
ACCESS BECAUSE, DESPITE HIS DILIGENT EFFORTS, 
SHE REFUSED TO FILE HIS NONFRIVOLOUS MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH THE ARIZONA COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
 
Although Lillie admits that she refused to file Merrick’s Motion for 
Reconsideration on November 8, she attempts to avoid responsibility for that 
decision by blaming Merrick himself. She primarily argues that Merrick 
failed to provide a copy of the court of appeals decision on which his Motion 
for Reconsideration was based, which she argues would have led her to 
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credit Merrick’s repeated unambiguous assertion that he was unrepresented, 
and in turn file his motion. Appellee Br. 21. Further, Lillie argues that 
Merrick’s motion was frivolous, that her refusal to file should be deemed 
merely negligent, and that liability cannot be premised on negligence.   
Lillie’s arguments fail for several reasons. For one, she demonstrates a 
persistent failure to view the facts in the light most favorable to Merrick, as 
required in an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. See Suzuki Motor 
Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Moreover, in an attempt to shift the focus away from her own misconduct, 
Lillie ignores the many efforts Merrick did make to file the motion (and that 
she was in actual possession of the apparently crucial court of appeals 
decision by Merrick’s filing deadline, ER 53, 74-75), and instead claims that 
he failed to act with diligence. Lillie’s deliberate refusal to file Merrick’s 
motion despite his timely submission and clear communication that he was 
filing pro per also indicate a level of culpability beyond that of mere 
negligence. 
A. Merrick Suffered an Actual Injury When Lillie’s Actions Caused 
Merrick to Miss His Filing Deadline. 
 
Lillie contends that Merrick cannot demonstrate actual injury because 
her refusal to file his Motion for Reconsideration only delayed his litigation. 
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Appellee Br. 14.1 Specifically, Lillie argues it was not her own misconduct 
that ultimately caused Merrick to miss his filing deadline; rather, she 
contends that Merrick failed to act diligently to “clear up the confusion or 
request an extension of time” after she refused his filing. Appellee Br. 15. 
This assertion mischaracterizes the record and reads the facts in the light 
least favorable to Merrick, both by ignoring Merrick’s unsuccessful efforts 
to remedy the situation, and by assuming based only on Lillie’s say-so that 
ILS would have filed Merrick’s motion if he had resubmitted it accompanied 
by the court of appeals decision.  
After Lillie refused to file Merrick’s timely motion on November 8, 
Merrick immediately filed a grievance with ILS in which he clearly 
reiterated that he had no attorney and that he was filing pro per: “ILS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To support this argument, she points to several dissimilar cases involving 
short delays that did not result in missed court deadlines. See, e.g., Vigliotto 
v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1202 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no violation when 
officials temporarily confiscated documents from plaintiff’s cell and gave 
him three days to have the documents removed from prison storage before 
they were destroyed); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(finding no violation after prison officials opened inmate’s letters outside of 
his presence when inmate failed to demonstrate that these actions resulted in 
missed deadlines); Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(finding plaintiff suffered no injury as a result of prison interference because 
his legal paperwork still arrived at the court on time); Hudson v. Robinson, 
678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff was not injured when ten-day 
wait for notary caused him to file a document after he would have liked, but 
before it was due). If anything, these cases support Merrick, because in 
contrast to the actions of those defendants, Lillie’s actions resulted in 
Merrick missing the deadline to file his motion.  
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returned my pro-per motion stating they wouldn’t process it because I had an 
attorney. I HAVE NO ATTORNEY!!! This is filed pro-per.” ER 230. 
Merrick appealed the denial of his initial grievance twice, explaining that 
ILS made an error: “I was not allowed to file a Pro-Per Motion for 
Reconsideration of my appeal with the Arizona Court of Appeals . . . This 
matter has not been addressed.” ER 231, 234-35. In addition, Merrick stated 
in his deposition that he attempted to contact the court and his former 
counsel to inform them that Lillie would not allow him to file the motion, 
but his attempts were unsuccessful. ER 107-08. Lillie did not refute this 
testimony.  
Despite these efforts, Lillie argues that Merrick did not act diligently 
because he did not try and overcome her misconduct in what she, in 
hindsight, views to have been the “correct” way. She contends that she 
would have filed Merrick’s Motion for Reconsideration had he provided her 
with the court of appeals decision denying his appeal. Appellee Br. 21-22. 
Yet Lillie never asked Merrick to provide the decision, nor does she cite any 
jail policy or rule requiring it. Furthermore, while Lillie states in her 
affidavit that ILS would have filed Merrick’s pro per motion had Merrick 
provided the decision, ER 53, there is no way for the Court to resolve this 
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issue in Lillie’s favor on summary judgment, when the facts must be 
construed in the light most favorable to Merrick. 
Moreover, Lillie admits she was actually in possession of the court of 
appeals decision on November 13, Appellee Br. 22; ER 53, when ILS 
received, copied, served, and filed the decision as an attachment to 
Merrick’s Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court. ER 53, 74-75. 
In addition, Merrick stated in an affidavit that he showed a copy of the 
decision to a grievance officer on November 8. ER 27. That officer 
forwarded Merrick’s grievance to ILS on November 14, and Lillie denied it 
that same day on the ground that she had already mailed his Petition for 
Review. ER 53, 77.2  
Finally, had Lillie truly believed that Merrick “lacked lawful 
authority” to file a motion for reconsideration—as she contends, Appellee 
Br. 16—the appropriate course would have been to request that Merrick 
provide her with a copy of the decision showing that he was permitted to file 
pro per, rather than simply leaving him to guess what additional actions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Even if Lillie had not seen the Arizona Court of Appeals decision by 
November 14, and even if Merrick had not repeatedly and unambiguously 
asserted his pro per status, logic dictates that Lillie should have been aware 
that Merrick was filing pro per based on his supplemental brief to his 
counsel’s Anders brief, ER 132; it would be nonsensical for a court to permit 




might convince Lillie to file the motion.3 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 
828 (1977) (holding the “fundamental constitutional rights of access to the 
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and 
filing of meaningful legal papers”) (emphasis added)). Perhaps in tacit 
recognition of this obligation, Lillie now claims on appeal that she “advised 
Merrick that without something from the Court of Appeals he needed to 
resubmit the document to be filed through counsel,” Appellee Br. 21. But 
this description is inconsistent with Lillie’s actual words: “Per the appeals 
court, you are not pro per in your appeals case and ILS cannot process your 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lillie also asserts that Merrick’s failure to submit the court of appeals 
decision is not excused by the evidence that it would have been futile for 
him to do so. She argues that resubmission of the motion “resembles the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, under which there is no futility exception.”  Appellee Br. 16 n.3.  
Even under Lillie’s PLRA analogy, however, Merrick was excused 
from resubmitting his motion with the court of appeals decision because he 
was never informed of that “requirement,” which Lillie asserted only after 
the fact. Although the PLRA does not have a futility exception, PLRA 
exhaustion is not required “when circumstances render administrative 
remedies ‘effectively unavailable.’” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 
(9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion excused when prison officials improperly 
screened inmate’s administrative appeals); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 
F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion excused when inmate “took 
reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust . . . and was precluded from 
exhausting, not through his own fault but by the [prison official’s] mistake); 
Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding exhaustion not 
required when prison officials refused to give inmate necessary forms to file 
a grievance); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding 
exhaustion excused when guards mistakenly informed inmate to wait for an 




documents as submitted. As you are represented by counsel and have access 
to the appellate court through him/her.” ER 60. Far from requesting proof of 
Merrick’s pro per status, Lillie flatly refused to file his document. Given that 
refusal, Lillie cannot now argue that she invited Merrick to resubmit his 
Motion for Reconsideration or fault him for pursuing a grievance rather than 
resubmitting his motion. 
B. Merrick Suffered an Actual Injury Despite the Fact that His 
Petition for Review Was Filed. 
 
Lillie advances two arguments related to the fact that she filed 
Merrick’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court. First, she 
contends that her subsequent filing of the Petition for Review is evidence 
that she would not have rejected a future attempt to mail a motion for 
reconsideration or a motion to extend time to file that document. Appellee 
Br. 17. Second, she argues that the filing of Merrick’s Petition for Review 
mitigated the harm resulting from her refusal to file his Motion for 
Reconsideration. Appellee Br. 17 n.4.  
First, Lillie has repeatedly asserted that she viewed Merrick’s Petition 
for Review as another reason not to file his Motion for Reconsideration. 
Until she received the Petition for Review, her position was that Merrick 
was represented, and therefore ineligible to file a motion for reconsideration. 
Once she received the petition, she took the position that the petition and the 
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motion were the same document, and refused to file the motion on that basis 
as well. Lillie asserts as much later in her brief, arguing that she “reasonably 
concluded the [Motion for Reconsideration] and the Petition for Review 
were one and the same.” Appellee Br. 22. Accordingly, contrary to Lillie’s 
self-serving assertion, any attempt by Merrick to resubmit his Motion for 
Reconsideration almost certainly would have failed; at a minimum, this 
Court cannot infer the contrary at summary judgment. 
To the extent Lillie’s factual assertion—that she confused Merrick’s 
Motion for Reconsideration with his Petition for Review—supports her 
argument that she was merely negligent, Merrick should be permitted to test 
it at trial. But this Court should also reject out of hand the proposition that 
conflating the two documents was “reasonable.” Not only was Lillie “in 
charge” of the unit responsible for providing constitutionally protected legal 
services to inmates seeking appeals in criminal cases, but she stated in her 
2014 affidavit that she had twelve and a half years of experience in ILS. ER 
51. Lillie further testified that her responsibilities include “daily supervision 
and training” and “ensur[ing] efficient and correct procedures are in place.” 
Id. That degree of experience and responsibility cannot be reconciled with 
Lillie’s decision not to file Merrick’s motion. Perhaps an ILS trainee could 
reasonably have failed to appreciate the difference between a Motion for 
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Reconsideration and a Petition for Review—but Lillie, as ILS supervisor, 
would have been responsible for correcting the error. See Valentine v. Beyer, 
850 F.2d 951, 957 (3rd Cir. 1988) (finding a violation of court access can 
occur when inadequately trained legal staff cause an inmate to miss court 
deadlines). 
Second, Lillie argues that “Merrick’s ability to pursue his Petition for 
Review with the Arizona Supreme Court, another form of discretionary 
appellate review on the same issues . . . also demonstrates the lack of actual 
injury.” Appellee Br. 17 n.4. To begin, this argument implies that an inmate 
can never assert an access to courts claim based on official interference with 
a motion for reconsideration, no matter how egregious, if the inmate is able 
to file a petition for review. But there is good reason that parties may usually 
opt to file a motion for reconsideration, a petition for review, or both, 
because they are markedly different avenues for relief. Of particular 
relevance here, a motion for reconsideration allows a party to address 
“specific points or matters in which it is claimed the appellate court erred in 
determination of facts or law.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.18(d). The Arizona 
Supreme Court, however, will not generally accept review in order to correct 
lower court errors. See Mast v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 680 P.2d 137, 138 
(Ariz. 1984) (“This court is committed to a policy of granting review only 
12 
	  
where substantial issues of law exist or serious error has occurred.”). Thus, 
where a court errs by overlooking a controlling opinion—as Merrick argues 
the Arizona Court of Appeals did in this case, discussed infra—the appellant 
would be more likely to succeed with a motion for reconsideration than in a 
petition for review. See Appellant Br. 41-43. Consequently, that Lillie filed 
Merrick’s Petition for Review does not mitigate her refusal to file his 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
C. Merrick’s Motion for Reconsideration Appropriately Argued that 
the Arizona Court of Appeals Overlooked Key Law and Facts, 
and Lillie Has Conceded that These Arguments Were Not 
Frivolous. 
 
Lillie responds to Merrick’s demonstration that his Motion for 
Reconsideration presented nonfrivolous arguments regarding errors of law 
and fact made by the Arizona Court of Appeals by stating that “the Arizona 
Court of Appeals had already considered and rejected these arguments.” 
Appellee Br. 18-19. Lillie’s response reflects a misunderstanding of the very 
purpose of a motion for reconsideration, which is to present argument about 
“specific points or matters in which it is claimed the appellate court has 
erred in determination of facts or law.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.18(d). The 
comments support the plain meaning of the rule, stating that motions for 
reconsideration should be filed to “inform the court of factual errors in its 
decision, order, or opinion… that the party believes the court has 
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overlooked.” Ariz R. Crim. P. 31.18, cmt. to 1997 amend. Merrick’s Motion 
for Reconsideration attempted to alert the court to exactly these types of 
errors.4 In fact, Arizona courts generally “do not consider arguments raised 
for the first time in a motion for reconsideration,” with only limited 
exceptions not relevant here. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Ctr., 235 
P.3d 285, 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (civil context). Thus, Lillie’s argument 
turns the law on its head—had Merrick’s Motion for Reconsideration 
included novel arguments, Lillie would have been within her rights to argue 
they should not be considered; she cannot argue that the reverse is also true. 
Because Lillie’s only argument regarding the substance of Merrick’s 
Motion for Reconsideration is that the Arizona Court of Appeals already 
considered and rejected Merrick’s arguments, she has effectively conceded 
that Merrick’s arguments were not frivolous. As this Court has previously 
held, an appellee waives any argument it fails to raise in its answering brief. 
United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an appellee 
waives any argument it fails to raise in its answering brief”); Stetco v. 
Holder, 498 F. App’x 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2012) (government waived any 
challenge to the arguments raised by the appellant when its sole mention of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Merrick’s Motion for Reconsideration argued the court of appeals either 
overlooked or misapplied relevant court decisions and statutes, and 
misconstrued the factual record. Appellant Br. 41-43. As Lillie does not 
refute the substance of these arguments, Merrick does not repeat them here.  
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the appellant’s argument consisted of a footnote indicating that the cases 
cited by appellant were not applicable); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 
1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (appellee waived argument regarding presumption of 
prejudice flowing from instructional error by failing to advance any 
argument in his answering brief that the error was harmless). Accordingly, 
this Court should conclude that the arguments advanced in Merrick’s Motion 
for Reconsideration were not frivolous. 
D. Lillie Acted with the Requisite Level of Culpability, or, at 
Minimum, Merrick Established a Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
as to Whether Lillie’s Conduct Is Actionable. 
 
1. Lillie’s Conduct Was Intentional. 
	  
Lillie argues that her refusal to file Merrick’s Motion for 
Reconsideration resulted from a series of confusing events and therefore 
amounts to a reasonable mistake. Appellee Br. 20-22. However, as the 
preceding section as well as Merrick’s opening brief show, Lillie’s repeated 
refusal to file Merrick’s Motion for Reconsideration was more than a 
mistake; it was a series of intentional acts sufficient to support an access to 
courts claim. See Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(An access to courts claim requires a plaintiff “to allege intentional conduct 
interfering with his legal mail, and does not require an additional showing of 
malicious motive,” such that holding plaintiff’s mail for over one year in 
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contravention of prison regulations alleged intentional conduct sufficient to 
violate his right of access to the courts). The cases on which Lillie relies to 
support her argument that her conduct was merely negligent, Appellee Br. 
19-20, are inapposite in that they involved accidents, rather than a prolonged 
refusal to file court documents in the face of an obligation to do so. See 
Ferrone v. Onorato, 298 F. App’x 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2008) (involving a 
mistake by the computer services division that resulted in blocking all e-
mails from a domain name rather than one e-mail address); Pink v. Lester, 
52 F.3d 73, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1995) (inmate’s money order request to pay 
docketing fee was never delivered to prison accounting office, a mistake that 
was “ministerial in nature”); Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 
1992) (summary judgment was proper where there was no evidence that 
alleged misplacement of a complaint was anything more than an isolated 
accident, and no prejudice resulted); Longshore v. Wash. State Dep’t of 
Corr., No. 3:15-CV-05059-KLS, 2015 WL 5797560, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 2, 2015) (loss of legal materials was negligent where prison officials 
placed materials in prison mail and searched for them after being notified 
that they were missing).5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Lillie argues that the fact that Merrick did include a copy of the Arizona 
Court of Appeals decision with his Motion for Reconsideration is enough to 
render this case similar to cases involving accidents or episodes of 
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Alternatively, even if this Court holds that the chain of undisputed 
events does not establish that Lillie acted intentionally, at minimum, there is 
a genuine dispute of material fact as to Lillie’s intent. See Simmons v. 
Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 184 (1st Cir. 1986) (plaintiff alleged adequate facts 
to show intentional deprivation of access to courts when he requested 
materials three times before he was told he could pick them up, at which 
point it was determined that the legal material was missing); Jackson v. 
Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986) (deliberate holding of 
plaintiff’s mail is sufficient to allege deprivation of substantive 
constitutional right, when officials should reasonably have known delay 
would deprive plaintiff of right to access the courts).  
2. At Minimum, Lillie’s Conduct Was Grossly Negligent, and 
Courts Permit Liability Where a Defendant’s Actions Fall Short 
of Intentional Conduct. 
 
Even if Lillie’s conduct was not intentional, this Court should 
nonetheless reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 
Merrick’s court access claim, either because negligent conduct can support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
carelessness. Appellee Br. 20-21. As discussed above, this argument does 
not hold water for many reasons, including that it fails to construe facts in 
the light most favorable to Merrick, and that Lillie actually saw a copy of the 
decision before the filing deadline. 
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such a claim, see Dorn v. Lafler, 601 F.3d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 2010),6 or 
because Lillie’s conduct satisfies an intermediate culpability standard at 
minimum.  
An intermediate standard of culpability is appropriate for four reasons. 
First, courts have recognized that intermediate standards of culpability such 
as gross negligence and deliberate indifference are proper where, as here, 
plaintiffs are particularly dependent on the state. See, e.g., Bovarie v. Tilton, 
No. 06CV687JLS (NLS), 2008 WL 761853, at *1, *5 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 
19, 2008) (prison officials acted with gross negligence and deliberate 
indifference when they effected procedures that restricted access to the 
prison law library); see also Taylor By and Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 
818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (allegations that state officials’ 
gross negligence and deliberate indifference rendered foster child comatose 
stated claim for deprivation of liberty interest); Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 
F.2d 817, 828 (3rd Cir. 1984) (en banc) (although officials’ conduct 
amounted only to negligence, gross negligence or reckless indifference was 
sufficient to establish a § 1983 claim based on injuries inflicted on claimant-
inmate by another inmate). Second, court access violations do not involve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Merrick argued in his opening brief that negligent conduct is sufficient to 
show a violation of a prisoner’s right of court access, Appellant Br. 32-34, 
and does not repeat that argument here.   
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the kind of “unforeseen circumstances” demanding “instant judgment” that 
the Supreme Court has held merit an intent-to-harm standard in the 
substantive due process context, Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 
(1998). Instead, as in this case, they will typically involve “time to make 
unhurried judgments,” so that indifference in the face of “extended 
opportunities to do better . . . teamed with protracted failure even to care” is 
“truly shocking.” Id. Third, an intermediate standard is appropriate where, 
like here, prison officials have an affirmative duty to ensure inmates have 
meaningful access to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824.  
Finally, courts that have rejected court access claims premised on 
simple negligence have either agreed, or else left open the possibility, that 
such claims are sufficient when premised on gross negligence or deliberate 
indifference. See Scheeler v. City of St. Cloud, 402 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 
2005) (requiring plaintiffs show that defendants displayed deliberate 
indifference to satisfy a right to access the courts claim); Snyder v. Nolen, 
380 F.3d 279, 291 n.11 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal because, 
although allegations that court clerk removed inmate’s pro se dissolution 
petition from the docket without consulting a judge constituted more than 
mere negligence, the official action complained of did not fall within scope 
of an access to courts claim); Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1318-
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19 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (at minimum, a showing of “deliberate indifference” to a 
right of court access would overcome qualified immunity); see also Daniels 
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (declining to decide whether 
recklessness or gross negligence is enough to trigger the protections of the 
Due Process Clause).   
Deliberate indifference requires a showing that a defendant 
recognized a specific unreasonable risk and acted intentionally to expose the 
plaintiff to that risk; gross negligence requires a showing that the defendant 
acted unreasonably with regard to a known risk. See, e.g., L.W. v. Grubbs, 
92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996) (defining deliberate indifference as 
encompassing situations in which “the defendant ha[s] actual knowledge of, 
or willfully ignore[s], impending harm,” and explaining that gross 
negligence “does not incorporate this notion of impending harm”);7 
Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1399 n.11 (10th Cir.1992) 
(“[R]ecklessness [i.e., reckless indifference] is generally regarded as 
satisfying the scienter requirement of section 1983 because it requires proof 
that the defendant focused upon the risk of unconstitutional conduct and 
deliberately assumed or acquiesced in such risk.”); Archuleta v. McShan, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 While this Court in Grubbs did not affirmatively define gross negligence, it 
analyzed the jury instruction defining gross negligence by contrasting it to 
the instruction on deliberate indifference and explaing that gross negligence 
requires only unreasonable acts in the face of a known risk. Id. at 899-900. 
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897 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir.1990) (“[R]ecklessness includes an element of 
deliberateness—a conscious, acceptance of a known, serious risk.”) 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 
1211, 1219 (7th Cir.1988) (en banc) (recklessness contains an intent 
component because the “reckless disregard of a great risk is a form of 
knowledge or intent”); Nishiyama v. Dickson Cnty., Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 
282 (6th Cir. 1987) (defining gross negligence: “a person may be said to act 
in such a way as to trigger a section 1983 claim if he intentionally does 
something unreasonable with disregard to a known risk or a risk so obvious 
that he must be assumed to have been aware of it, and of a magnitude such 
that it is highly probable that harm will follow”).8  
Drawing all inferences in Merrick’s favor, Lillie’s conduct was 
deliberately indifferent because her intentional and repeated refusal to file 
Merrick’s motion—in the face of his diligent efforts to inform Lillie of his 
pro per status, and her actual knowledge of the contents of the court of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nishiyama held that an allegation of gross negligence was sufficient to 
state a § 1983 claim for a violation of substantive due process, without 
regard to whether the plaintiff was in the custody of the state. See id. The 
Sixth Circuit restricted Nishiyama’s holding in Stemler v. City of Florence, 
which held that reckless indifference was required for a prisoner to state a 
substantive due process claim. 126 F.3d 856, 870 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 
294, 303 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 251 (1976)). However, 
the Court did not revise Nishiyama’s definition of gross negligence.  
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appeals decision permitting him to file, discussed supra, 7-8 and at 
Appellant Br. 3-6, 23-29—prevented Merrick from pursuing relief from the 
court of appeals. Alternatively, at a minimum, Lillie’s conduct constitutes 
recklessness or gross negligence, because her refusal to file Merrick’s 
Motion for Reconsideration completely disregarded the obvious risk that 
Merrick’s motion would never reach the courthouse. 
II.  MERRICK’S COMPLAINT STATED CLAIMS FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF HIS RELIGIOUS LIBERTY THAT SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AT THE SCREENING STAGE. 
 
The State argues that Merrick did not sufficiently allege that the jail 
policy of prohibiting unmonitored clergy phone calls substantially burdened 
his religious exercise, as required to state a claim under the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et 
seq. and Arizona’s substantially identical Free Exercise of Religion Act 
(“FERA”), Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1493.01 et seq. Appellee Br. 25. This 
argument inaccurately reflects both Merrick’s complaint and RLUIPA’s 
requirements. Moreover, it fails to construe the complaint liberally in 
Merrick’s favor, as it must do both because the complaint was dismissed at 





A. Merrick Alleged that the Jail’s Policy Against Unmonitored, 
Telephonic Confessions Substantially Burdened His Religious 
Exercise. 
 
The State argues that “Merrick did not allege . . . that his religious 
belief mandates contact with his clergy by telephone, or, more specifically, 
unmonitored phone call[s].” Appellee Br. 25. But this ignores that Merrick’s 
complaint alleged plainly that he requested that jail personnel “approve 
unmonitored, unrecorded clergy calls as a requirement of his religious 
practices (confession, spiritual guidance, and counseling).” ER 263 
(emphasis added). On the same page, Merrick alleged that the effect of the 
denial of private clergy calls was that he “was not allowed to practice his 
religious sacraments,” and that he “believes GOD has punished him and will 
do so later.” Id. Later, Merrick again alleged that “it was his religious 
practice and beliefs to confess, seek spiritual advice and obtain counseling 
from his clergy only. He could not do this with persons of another faith.” ER 
268. Although, as argued below, Merrick was not required to demonstrate 
that private phone calls are a mandatory aspect of his religious practice in 
order to merit protection under RLUIPA, these allegations satisfy even the 
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State’s overly strict view of “substantial burden.”9 
In the same vein, the State argues that Merrick did not allege that in-
person visits from his clergy in Oklahoma “were impossible,” but any 
reasonable reading of Merrick’s complaint permits the inference that his 
clergy is unable to travel from Oklahoma to Merrick’s prison, located on 
Arizona’s western border; at minimum, Merrick’s allegation that he was 
indigent, ER 265, demonstrates that he would be unable to fund the lengthy 
journey. Additionally, the State argues that Merrick’s description in his 
direct appeal of “his written correspondence to his clergy as ‘confessions, 
counseling and spiritual guidance,’ demonstrat[es] that confession via mail 
is acceptable under the precepts of his religious beliefs.” Appellee Br. 25-26 
(internal citations omitted). That Merrick apparently practiced religion in 
another fashion in the past is, at most, a question for the State to explore 
during discovery—and not an appropriate basis to dismiss his RLUIPA 
claim at the screening stage. In this regard, it is significant that Merrick 
testified during his deposition that his religious beliefs had changed since the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The State’s brief cites Hartman v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 
1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2015), for its definition of substantial burden: “to state 
a claim under RLUIPA, inmates must “plead . . . factual allegations showing 
their religious exercise was so burdened as to pressure them to abandon their 
beliefs.” Appellee Br. 24. While Hartman provides one example of a 
substantial burden arising out of the Ninth Circuit, the cases cited in 
Merrick’s Opening Brief more fully define “substantial burden,” particularly 
regarding religious accommodation claims. See Appellant Br. 47-49. 
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events that gave rise to his conviction, so his previous religious practice does 
not shed light on the substantial burden question. ER 117-18.  
In any event, even if Merrick’s religion did permit him to confess to 
clergy via other methods, it is irrelevant because a burdened practice need 
not be part of a central tenet of an adherent’s faith in order to receive 
RLUIPA’s protections. The text of RLUIPA itself defines “religious 
exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, 
or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) 
(emphasis added); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) 
(“RLUIPA’s ‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks whether the government has 
substantially burdened religious exercise . . . not whether the RLUIPA 
claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise”); Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“RLUIPA bars inquiry into 
whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion”); 
Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is 
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or 
practices to a faith”); Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 332 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“The practice burdened need not be central to the adherent's 
belief system”). “Religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent 
or comprehensible to others in order to merit” protection. Thomas v. Review 
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Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); see also Lindell v. 
McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2003) (The fact that the inmate’s alleged 
religious belief was not a mainstream religion was not a disqualifying fact).  
Finally, the Court should resist the State’s invitation to question 
Merrick’s sincerity at the screening stage, Appellee Br. 26, because whether 
Merrick’s beliefs are sincerely held and rooted in religious belief are 
questions of fact. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“the 
threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case . . . is, 
of course, a question of fact”); United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 
854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“whether [inmate’s] religious beliefs are sincerely held. 
. . is a question of fact.”). Merrick alleges that they are sincerely held and 
rooted in religious belief, and on review of the district court’s screening 
order, the Court must accept Merrick’s factual allegations as true and grant 
him the benefit of all inferences that may be derived from them. See 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 
B. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Merrick’s Establishment 
Clause Claim. 
 
Although the district court did not discuss its reasons for dismissing 
Merrick’s Establishment Clause claim, the State argues for affirmance on the 
alternate ground that Merrick failed to allege sufficient facts to support that 
claim. Appellee Br. 27-29. In so doing, the State relies on the district court’s 
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language that Merrick “has not alleged facts demonstrating that the Jail’s 
phone policies were enforced without a legitimate penological purpose.” ER 
17-18. Additionally, the State argues that “Merrick does not allege the jail 
policy against unmonitored phone calls to clergy unduly preferred another 
religion over his own,” asserting that “the alleged facts demonstrate the jail 
officials’ attempts to accommodate Merrick’s request for counseling and 
spiritual guidance.” Appellee Br. 28. Furthermore, the State argues that 
“Merrick does not explain how this general policy or attempts at 
accommodation ‘pressured [him] to change his beliefs and practices to ones 
that the Jail would allow (which were other faiths),’ when those other faiths 
apparently are subject to the same policy.” Appellee Br. 29 (internal 
citations omitted). This Court should nonetheless reverse. 
First, in arguing that Merrick did not allege that the prison’s policy 
lacked a legitimate penological purpose,10 the State misstates the relevant 
burdens. Under Turner, Merrick need only include sufficient facts to 
indicate the plausibility that the actions of which he complains were not 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Gee v. Pacheco, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Courts balance a prisoner’s right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity 
to exercise religious freedom against the prison’s legitimate penological 
goals. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Under the Turner 
standard, a regulation is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.” Id. 
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627 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010) (prisoner plaintiff does not need to 
“identify every potential legitimate interest and plead against it,” but rather 
should “plead facts from which a plausible interest can be drawn that the 
action was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest” 
because “we do not intend that pro se prisoners must plead, exhaustively, in 
the negative in order to state a claim”). Because the State was not required to 
respond to Merrick’s complaint, the record contains no indication why the 
jail denied the phone calls. However, Merrick alleged in his complaint that 
unmonitored legal calls were permitted, ER 268, raising questions as to why 
unmonitored clergy calls present different or greater challenges to prison 
administration. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669-70 (7th Cir. 
2009) (holding it premature at the pleading stage to determine whether 
budgetary restrictions or security concerns were legitimate penological 
reasons to deny a detainee religious articles); see also Maddox v. Love, 655 
F.3d 709, 720 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding it premature at the pleading stage to 
determine whether budgetary restrictions or security concerns were 
legitimate penological reasons to cancel African Hebrew Israelite services). 
Second, the State’s argument that Merrick’s complaint “does not 
allege the jail policy against unmonitored calls to clergy unduly preferred 
another religion over his own,” Appellee Br. 28, fails to draw all inferences 
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in Merrick’s favor, as is required at the screening stage. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 
680 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (at the screening stage, the court 
“accept[s] . . . as true” “the stated facts . . . from [plaintiff’s] complaint”). 
 Merrick alleged that the jail unduly preferred other religions over his 
own when he asserted that jail officials “pressured [him] to change his 
beliefs and practices to ones that the Jail would allow (which were other 
faiths).” ER 267. Additionally, Merrick alleged that Defendant Wade told 
him “confessions are done anonymously and he doesn’t have to have one of 
his faith”; that Defendant Garcia told him he “could use MCSO clergy”; that 
Defendant Chaplain Paul “said the Diocese doesn’t allow confessions over 
the phone, but Plaintiff could . . . get counseling from the two priests of 
another faith.” ER 267-68. Finally, Merrick alleged that, in suggesting that 
he consult with a clergyperson of a different religion, the Defendants 
“sponsor[ed] and enforce[d] what they felt were acceptable religious 
practices in the jail and denied plaintiff his beliefs and practices.” ER 268.  
These allegations are sufficient to survive the screening stage based 
on the Establishment Clause principle that “the efforts of prison 
administrators, when assessed in their totality, must be evenhanded” and 
“the treatment of all inmates must be qualitatively comparable.” Maddox, 
655 F.3d at 719-20 (citing Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th 
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Cir. 1991)). Jail personnel statements that Merrick did not need to engage in 
confession with his own clergy, and that confessions do not need to be 
anonymous, as well as their suggestion that Merrick confess to a clergy from 
another religion, are sufficient to allege that the jail disfavored Merrick’s 
religion, while endorsing other religions over Merrick’s. United States v. 
Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (“The state, through the 
establishment clause, cannot require persons to worship in particular ways”). 
 Accordingly, Merrick’s religious freedom claims should be remanded 
for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the District Court should 
be reversed and this case should be remanded. This Court should direct entry 
of summary judgment for Merrick on the court access claim, or in the 
alternative should instruct the District Court to proceed with trial. In 
addition, this Court should remand Merrick’s religious freedom claims for 
further proceedings. 
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